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1947



PALESTINE

Fine No. 951

pp. 9667 - 9860

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Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Next Paper.

E9676

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Bowker
No. 2028
16th October, 1947

D. 7.14 p.m. 16th October, 1947 R. 8.44 p.m. 16th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagded, Beirut, Damascus (Beirut please pass as my telegram No. 140) Jedda, C.-in-C. M.E.L.F., G.O.C. B.T.E. and Saving to Amman.

IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 2016: Troop movemen Com Palestinian frontier.

Egyptian Minister of National Defence told Chief of British Military Mission to-day in response to the latter's enquiry that one Egyptian Infantry Battalion, one troop of Field Artillery, one troop of 3.7 howitzers, one troop of light tanks and some smaller units were to be moved to El Arish. The total strength of the force would be between 1,800 and 2,000 men. The Minister did not mention dates but General Arbuthnot learns from another reliable source that move will take place on October 19th.

Minister said that reason given for move would be that Egyptian Army needed to carry out combined training in an area free of cholera. There has in fact for some time past been talk of such exercises being held in Sinai. Minister admitted that real reason for move was to protect Palestine Arabs in the event of trouble but he added that he had told Egyptian Prime Minister that there could be no question of sending Egyptian troops into Palestine so long as British remained there.

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OFFICE,

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2 2 OCT 1947

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ONE TIME PAD.

Recd 19 Oct 47.

From: - C in C MELF.

D.T.O. 181236B Oct.

To: - War Office.

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET. GI/224437?.

For MI 3.

Your should see Embassy Cairo signals to Foreign Office No 2028 of 16 Oct and 2032 of 17 Oct reporting forthcoming move of about 2000 Egyptian Tps to Sinai in order "to protect the Palestine Arab". Newspapers here state reason for move is to replace existing grn Dl Arish and combat smuggling. We estimate present str garrison El Garish as approx 400. Message Control.

Distribution by M. I. 3a.

Copies to DHO DDIAO(A) 110 1, 4, DIIDDMI(I) MI 3, 3(a),
Foreign Office (Mr. Boith). Colonial Office (Lt.Col.Chalmers)

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Next Paper.

Please see the Secretary of State's minute on the attached copy of Beirut telegram No. 758 about Syrian troop movements.

The correspondence began with the High Commissioner's telegram in E 9781 in which he suggested taking a very strong line with the Syrian Government. The comments of H.M. Charge d'Affaires at Damascus are in E 9695. The Colonial Office have now sent the attached telegram No. 2547 to the High Commissioner in which they deprecate the idea of further representations in Syria. Our general attitude has also been made clear in our recent guidance telegram to the Arab posts, and no further action seems to be required for the time being.

There is unfortunately now news of a further incident on the Palestine-Syria frontier in Mr. Dundas's telegram No. 85. This is addressed to Jerusalem and we can await a statement of information from there before considering this further.

> (B.A.B. Burrows) 23rd October, 1947.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans. No. 758.

D: 4.43 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

16th October, 1947.

R: 6.35 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Cairo,

B.M.E.O. Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Amman, Jorusalem

IMP OR TANT

TOP SECRET

Jerusalem telegram No. 1,921 to the Colonial Office; Palestine. Co-led

The Syrian Government appear to have withdrawn with unnecessary haste and to have given equally unnecessary publicity to their troop movements. I think this, subject to the views of His Majesty's Charge d'Affairs Damascus, might be pointed out privately to the Syrian Government. to ask any Arab Government even the Lebanese to withdraw their troops once they have moved to the frontier would be to invite a rebuff. They would be unwilling and unable to comply with any such request and would point out that troop movements were in accordance with the Arab League decision. Furthermore to contend that the presence of Arab troops on the Palestinian frontier were [sic] only an element making for disorder would be to expose oneself to the riposte that the Jewish Hagana and terrorist organisations were a far greater threat to public security. The Arabs would even deny that the presence of their troops constituted a danger and would refer to assurances given after the Arab League meeting that no intervention would take place until British evacuation had been completed, when it would be essential to fill the vacuum. They would probably add that the measures taken were in the circumstances the least the Arab States could do, saying as Azzam Pasha told me (see my telegram No. 756) that the measures merely represented moral support for the Palestine Arabs.

I fear representations to the Syrian Government or to other Arab Governments in connexion with their troop movements will only serve to irritate the Arabs and to disturb the favourable atmosphere created by the Colonial Secretary's statement. If however the Governments are urged to do everything possible to ensure that no incidents occur on the frontier as a result of those movements, I do not think they would be unresponsive. Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 195.

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OFFICE,

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OIP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans. No. 758.

D: 4.43 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

16th October, 1947. R: 6.35 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Cairo,

B.M.E.O. Cairo,

Bagdad, Damascus. Jedda.

Amman. Jerusalem. E 9676

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IMPORTANT

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Jerusalem telegram No. 1,921 to the Colonial Office; Palestine.

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PALESTINE

E 9695 9

Registry Number E769 1951/31

1947

TELEGRAM FROM

Dated

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in Registry 600

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Next Paper.

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* now see below * not not work a non E 9781

(Minutes.)

We have not yet received a copy of Jerusalem telegram No. 1921 but I am informed that it consists of a request by the High Commissioner that we should weigh in with the Syrians in the matter of their recent troop movements. It was apparently sent before the High Commissioner took cognizance of the action taken by Mr. Dundas in Damascus. The Colonial Office are therefore replying to the High Commissioner in the form of a telegram drawing attention to Mr. Dundas's telegrams and suggesting that no further action is required.

As regards the suggestion made by Mr. Evans in paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 758 in E 9676, I think we can assume that the Syrians are already warned, as a result of Mr. Dundas's representations, that we rely upon them not to cause any incidents on the Palestine frontier.

co. arc sending in a copy of Jernalin M 1921

See minh by S/1 m (J. G. S. Beith.)

Beint No. 758 (E 9676) 18th October, 1947.

NB termalem tel. No. 1921 and a further out cry from the High Commissioner No. 1944 win now be found in E9781. The Colonial Othic are drafting a soothing repty, giving no hope that we shall make further representations

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

representations to the Syrians. The Co. with clear this tel- with us and repeat it to Avab posts.

The Avab posts.

Out. 21

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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas. No. 450.

D: 5.48 p.m.16th October, 1947.

16th October, 1947. R: 7.36 p.m.16th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem,

Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda.

Amman. U.K.Delegation New York E 9695

Beirut Saving.

PERSONAL

17 OCT

Jerusalem telegram No. 1,921 to Secretary of State for the Colonies paragraph 4.

Movement of Syrian troops to Quaitra area though, I believe, planned some days in advance did not take place until after the Arab League Council's decision to recommend that the troops should be moved. It therefore has the sanction of an Arab League decision behind it and I do not feel in these circumstances that any attempt to persuade the Syrian Government to withdraw them would meet with success.

In my opinion one of the reasons which caused the Syrians to take such precipitate action was the very circumstantial rumours that Transjordan forces were on the move. When it becomes apparent that these rumours may be untrue and as soon as the winter rains begin many Syrian troops may well be without publicity, withdrawn to their winter quarters.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 3 and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 73.

[Repeated to U.K.Delegation New York and B.M.E.O. Cairo].

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| 1947 | PALESTINE | E 9705 |
| Registry Number E9705/95/91 TELEGRAM FROM No. Dated Received in Registry 14, 204 | Arapenih gist of live speeches delivered ~ belanero l'Acember Oct-11. Ly Repety Khalel abi Towdet, and Prime Minister | |
| Last Paper. | (Minutes.) This is not very important. | |
| References. | | (T. E.CABLE) |
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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E 9705

En Clair.

GABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE OCT

No. 67 Saving. 14th October, 1947. R: 9.50 a.m. 17th October, 1947.

Repeated to Amman No. 95.

Jedda No. 94.

Damascus No. 245

Bagdad No. 89

Cairo Embassy No. 65

"B.M. E. O. No. 48)

Jerusalem No. 67.

Palestine.

Following is gist of two speeches delivered in Lebanese Chamber October 11th.

[Begins]

Deputy Khalel Abi Jowdet (Maronite). "The Lebanese people welcome the League's decisions for Palestine's defence. Zionism is threatening the Lebanon. It is said the Army has been ordered to move to the frontiers and await instructions. The Jews of Palestine are fully armed with up to date arms. I am not asking for a military secret but would like to know whether our army has been sent to the frontier and what precautions are being taken by the Government for its safety:

"I have to make it Prime Minister Riad Solh. clear that the Lebanon will in no way abandon its privileged position. It is our duty to be with the Arabs our brethren and help them when they need our help. I remind you that a few years age when this country was occupied by the colonial army we feared nobody but we fought until we secured our wishes and independence. (Applause). We shall strive in the cause of Palestine, and we shall increase our arms in the near future. I have always said the Lebanen will net only take part in the talks of the Arab League but will invite them to meet here. Here they are to-day as other Arab conferences have been. Lebanon will fulfil her duties and will not give away her privileged position. It is encouraging to see how well our delegation in America is received by our Lebanese OCT brethren.

[Ends].

AAAA

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

9712

[This telegram is of particular Becker and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

En Clair

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans No. 65. Saving

9th October, 1947.

R. 17th October 1947

Repeated to:

U.K. Delegation New York No. 5 Embassy Cairo No. 61 B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 45

B.M.E.O. Caire No. 45 Jerusalem No. 61 Bagdad No. 79

Damascus No. 226 Amman No. 84

Jedda No. 82

Palestine.

The fellowing resolution was adopted unanimously at the meeting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on October 7th.

[Begins].

We, members of the Lebanese Parliament, wholeheartedly welcome the Arab League Council to the Lebanon and willingly agree to accept all the decisions taken by the League for the defence of Palestine.

[Ends].

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PALESTINE

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Azzam Pasha in this conversation takes a much more sober line than in his recent public pronouncements Indeed, this telegram suggests that the Arabs are gradually facing up to the realities of the situation. This impression is supported by the line taken by Samir Pasha as reported in Amman telegram Nol 310 (E 9271/G), - making allowance for the possibility that Samir Pasha was not speaking the whole truth.

Azzam Pasha still speaks in terms of Arab armies intervening in Palestine, but only "if the Palestine Arabs were in the process of being defeated" and he emphasises that the Palestinian Arabs would not be the aggressors, nor indulge in provocation, but would only defend themselves if attacked by the Zionists. Samir Pasha, on the other hand, indicates that the Arab States as a whole have come to regard actual intervention in Palestine by Arab armies as impracticale and that they are coming to think in terms of sending volunteers, arms and money to assist the local Arabs. Samir Pasha has clearly come to accept some form of partition as inevitable, (though whether he is justified in representing the other Arab politicians as being equally resigned is questionable) and he is thinking in terms of an Arab rising in the Jewish state. This is clearly a very grave danger, but one which would presumably be reduced in proportion as the smaller the boundaries of the Jewish state were drawn.

It seems, indeed, to be possible, looking ahead, to envisage, after our withdrawal, that Palestine will disintegrate into Jewish and Arab areas and that

some/

Wt. 1772/717 17895 1778 F.O.P.

some form of stalemate may be reached, from which the future "set-up" for Palestine could perhaps be worked out, with the sanction of the United Nations. There are bound to be serious local clashes and disturbances, but the fact that the Arabs, who would appear to hold the whip hand in the long run, are taking a more sober line, is at least encouraging.

It is interesting to note that as Azzam Pasha looks back wistfully to the Morrison plan, which the Arabs rejected so flatly last year.

Param 21st October, 1947

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

E 9712

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE (18 OC

Mr. Evans

D. 1.08 p.m. 16th October, 1947

No. 756 16th October, 1947.

R. 4.05 p.m. 16th October, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York
Washington
Jerusalem
Cairo
British Middle East Office
Bagdad
Jedda
SAVING
Amman
Damascus

SECRET

Palestine.

Azzam Pasha whem I saw en October 14th said that the measures decided en by the Arab League were necessary as a counter weight to Hagana and ther Jewish organisations and described them as "Moral Support" for the Palestinian Arabs who were without means of defence and whose plight the Arab League could not afford to ignore. He emphasised however that the Palestinian Arabs would not (repeat not) be the aggressors nor indulge in provocation but would only defend themselves if attacked by the Zionists. He added that the Arab armies would only intervene if the Palestinian Arabs were in the process of being defeated and that in any case this would not occur until the British withdrawal had been completed.

- 2. Azzam Pasha said that the ex-Mufti had tried to impress the Arab League with his gang leaders but it had been made plain to him that in the view of responsible Arabs little could be achieved that way. No single personality (including the ex-Mufti) could [gp. undec. ? attempt to] dictate to the League. The League had however to play the ex-Mufti's cards as his language was the only one which the Zionist terrorists understood.
- Government Azzam Pasha said that the possibility had been discussed but he had opposed it. He had explained the position to the ex-Musti who had agreed with the League's decision. Azzam Pasha said that in his opinion it might be necessary later on to set up some sort of provisional Government (in which the

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Arab leaders from the various Arab countries might take a hand) to arrange for a Constituent Assembly to enable the Palestinian Arabs to Regime on their form of Government. The Jews might then be effered settlement on the basis of the Morrison proposal which the Arabs had been unable to accept last year but which they might well accept in the pircumstances he envisaged. Whether the evasive ex-Multi player a part would depend on whether or not his mentality changed.

whatever of the identity of Arab and British interests. Both found themselves between two [gp. undec], termini nominally [gp. undec] the United States and the U.S.S.R. whose ideologies suited neither the British nor the Arabs. He compared the Americans to a young well-fed horse leaving its stable and trampling on everybody. More signs of the Arabs friendliness towards Great Britain would now be evident but for the state of popular excitement existing in the Arab countries, not the least in Egypt. Unfortunately the Arab leaders were not always able to use wise words as they would inevitably not always be understood by the people. He was confident however that the Egyptian question would soon be solved satisfactorily.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Delegation New York and Washington as my telegram Nos. 37 and 15 respectively and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 194.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York and Washington].

FO 371 61883

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| 194 | PALESTINE | 18 OCT |
| Registry E 97/6/78//3/ Number E 97/6/78//3/ TELEGRAM FROM (IK M) No. Uk M Owk Dated Received in: Registry // Oct / 8 | Refer UK Kel til 2928 Frankler Kold 154 Oct 14 fan Golo | Hectings. 3 (69636/957/81) 16d meetings an inches mode. |
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En Clair

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2959. D. 8.27 p.m. 17th October, 1947. R. 3.20 a.m. 18th October, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

IMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 2928.

Palestine Committee.

The Committee held its 15th and 16th meetings on the 16th October. The first speaker was Prince Feisal (Saudi Arabia) who declared that Britain bore the primary responsibility for the present situation in Palestine. The Arabs would not accept the UNSCOP majority plan as a basis for discussion and they would resist partition if an attempt were made to impose it. The Arab Governments were ready to assist the Palestine Arabs to maintain law and order in the transition period following the British withdrawal.

- anable to support any of the proposals hitherto made because they conflicted with the Charter. A legitimate solution for the problem must be based on the free will of the Palestine population. The General Assembly had no power to take executive action; it could not establish an army of volunteers, but could only make a recommendation in that sense to the Security Council. Would the Assembly be willing to make such a recommendation in the knowledge that it would provoke a conflict, the extent of which could not be foreseen? He proposed that an effort should be made to establish a mixed committee of Arabs and Jews to consider the situation, and that the United Nations should assume responsibility for administering Palestine until the Committee arrived at a settlement.
- 3. The Colonial Secretary then made the statement contained in my telegram No. 2938.
- 4. Lawrence (South Africa) defended the Mandatory Power against its critics and supported the Majority Plan subject to some revision of the frontiers.
- 5. Belt (Cuba) said that he had been convinced by the Jews themselves that the Majority Plan would not provide a just settlement. He quoted both Silver's speech in the Committee and an advertisement inserted in the press by supporters of the Irgun, to show that the Majority proposal would not satisfy the Zionists who at next Assembly would ask for more living space. Cuba would support a comprehensive plan for the settlement of displaced persons.

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- 6. Berendsen (New Zealand) favoured the Majority Plan but insisted that the Committee must concern itself with the means by which it was to be carried into effect.
- 7. Jamali (Iraq) and Heikel (Egypt) then elaborated the Arab case. Jamali dwelt at length on the influence of Eionism on the policy of the United States and pointed out that neither the non-Zionist Jews nor the extreme wing of the Eionists themselves accepted Partition. The Jewish Agency was not representative of the Jewish Deople as a whole. He warned the Committee that partition would not end the trouble in Palestine. Heikel argued that a decision creating a Jewish State was not within the competence of the General Assembly. Consequently it would have no international effect and would bind nobedy.
- Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) said that a people's will to live as a nation was sufficient justification for the establishment of a State. Undertakings given at an earlier date by His Majesty's Government had no bearing on the validity of the Mandate. He admitted that the provision made by the UNSCOP majority for the pretection of Arab cultivators in the Jewish State might be strengthened. Speaking on the juridical situation he said that the responsibility of the Assembly would end when it made recommendations to His Majesty's Government. That use was made of the recommendations would be for His Majesty's Government to decide in the framework of their international obligations. He endorsed the United States statement on this point and deprecated the "unilateral laying down of international obligations". Lisicky then asked a number of questions concerning the proposal for an international volunteer force. Who would select Should recruiting be restricted in any way? recruits? That would be the language of command? Who would provide the training equipment and arms? What military code would be observed? Who would provide for the dependents of members of the force killed on duty? How long would it take to give the force adequate training? If the Langatory was to be asked to carry on during this period, would it not be simpler to ask the Mandatory to stay throughout the period of transition? Finally he asked whether contingents of regular forces might not present fewer disadvantages.
- 9. After dinner Arslan (Syria) underlined remark in Colonial Secretary's speech that "the national home has been established". Morgenstierne (Norway) supported the Majority Plan and also the proposal for a liquidation of the problem of displaced persons. Granados (Guatemala) accused Chamoun (Lebanon) of having misled the Committee by falsifying the text of Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Chamoun turned the tables, however, by showing that he had quoted it from the record of an earlier speech by Granados himself.
- 10. The general debate was then closed. At its next two meetings the Committee will hear spokesmen for the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 99.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jeru-salem].

E 9717

1947

PALESTINE

18 OCT

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Mr. Jeins

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Bowker. No. 2052.

D. 10.56 a.m. 17th October 1947.

17th October 1947.

R. 1.31 p.m. 17th October 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem,
Bagdad,
Beirut (please pass Damascus as my
telegram No.141),

Jedda, and Saving to Amman, also repeated to C.-in-C. M.E.L.F., G.O.C.B.T.E.

OCT 18

SECRET.

My telegram No. 2028: troop mevements en Palestinian frontier.

Chief of Military Missien is anxieus that source of his information should not be revealed since his friendly relations with the Minister of National Defence might otherwise be compromised.

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PALESTINE PALESTINE

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118 OCT

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

Cypher/OTP

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2962.

D. 8.30 p.m. 17th October, 1947.

17th October, 1947 R. 2.55 a.m. 18th October, 1947.

Repeated to Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

Following personal for High Commissioner for Palestine from Martin.

[Begins] With regard to the point made in (3) of paragraph 3 of my telegram of to-day regarding consequences of withdrawal, you will note from the text of the statement made yesterday by the Secretary of State that he categorically denied that there is any truth in rumeurs and assertions that His Majesty's Government has given any encouragement or assistance to actions likely to inflame the situation in the Middle East. In view of persistent allegations made in Jewish In view of persistent allegations made in Jewish terrorist fund-raising advertisements and articles in American press that aggressive action by Arabs is being encouraged by British officials and that withdrawal by British troops will be arranged in such a way as to facilitate Arab domination over Palestine, you may wish to give full local publicity to relevant passage in Secretary of State's statement should there be signs of such allegations becoming current in Palestine. [Ends]

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].



9724 95 1/31

En Clair

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DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2968

D. 11.27 a.m. 18th October, 1947

Repeated to High Commissioner, Jerusalem,

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 2962.

Preamble should read.

Please pass to Jerusalem.

[Begins].

Addressed to Jerusalem telegram No. 100 of 17th October, repeated Foreign Office and Washington Saving. [Ends].

Please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 101.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].



S 6 Reference

(Action completed)

Next Paper



LONGACRE 5-2070



E 3727 = 20

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMPIRE STATE BUILDING 20 OCT

MPIRE STATE BUILDIT

TELEPHONE:

REPLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED P. O. BOX 304 NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

4th October, 1947.


My dear Peter,

I have not written before because the reactions to the Colonial Secretary's statement on Palestine have been very slow in developing. Even now comment has not passed beyond the point reached in Lisicky's speech summarised in my telegram reporting the 5th Meeting of the Palestine Committee.

- 2. Above all the attitude of the U.S. Delegation is still shrouded in obscurity. There is at least artistic truth in the rumour that they received from Washington a draft of a statement to be made in the Committee, and rejected it as having no ascertainable meaning. They have now told the Iraqis that they intend to make a non-committal statement in the course of next week. Judging from Silver's speech (our telegram No. 2741), I should guess that the Zionists have been discouraged in Washington where they must have been trying to persuade the U.S. Government to take over the responsibility for implementing the Majority Report.
- 3. Both the Jewish Agency leaders and the Arab Delegates here show much more readiness than their people in Palestine to believe that we are really determined to quit. The Zionists are pinning their hopes, I think, on some kind of endorsement by the Assembly of the Majority Report, which would enable them to claim international sanction for an attempt to set up a Jewish State in Palestine. The Arabs are still inclined to regard the problem as fundamentally an Anglo-Arab affair. I enclose a copy of a brief record of opinions expressed by Nuri at a small dinner party last night. I have not recorded the whole conversation, but the difficulties in the way of his proposals were carefully explained to him.
- 4. On the very scattered evidence available so far I should say that Nuri is probably right in his estimate that a two-thirds majority will not be found for any positive proposals incorporating the means for giving effect to them. We must, therefore, look forward to a short period,/

THE PUBLIC RECORD

I. P. Garran, Esq., FOREIGN OFFICE.



period, after the end of the Assembly, in which we and the two peoples living in Palestine have a last chance to work out some sort of modus vivendi to avoid anarchy when we leave. But it is too early to exclude the possibility that some settlement may be recommended here and that we may be asked to participate in carrying it out. If that should happen, we may be faced with an exceedingly difficult decision. Incidentally, I was much relieved by your telegram No. 3136.

5. The Colonial Secretary is hoping to receive an estimate of the earliest date on which our forces and administration could be withdrawn from Palestine. I assume that this is being worked out in London and in Jerusalem, and that you will let us know the results of these enquiries before long.

Yours ever,

VISES OF H.E. HURI PASHA.

On the 3rd October, the Colonial Secretary and Sir Hartley Shawcross dined with Nuri Pasha. A few other guests were present, including Dr. Jamali.

- Nuri Pasha said that he did not believe the United Nations would succeed in adopting by a two-thirds majority any solution for the Palestine problem. Speaking realistically, therefore, the question/eastill be treated as one for Angle-Arab agreement. He could not believe that the British intended to evacuate Palestine in conditions which would mean that their departure was immediately followed by chaos and bloodshed. He supposed, therefore, that they would try to obtain a settlement before they left.
- of settlement. A resolute effort should be made to find permanent hopes immediately for all the displaced persons in Europe; if this were done the Arab countries would take their share. Secondly, the Jewish population of Palestine should be released from the intimidation to wich they were at present subjected by a small minority of terrorists. Muri Pasha did not believe that these terrorists numbered more than 4 or 5 thousand. If they were removed from the country, the Jewish community as a whole would feel able to adopt a more cooperative attitude and an agreed settlement might then become possible.
- Palestine form a provisional Government and hold elections as a foundation for the establishment of a Constitutional Government in a unitary state. The Arabs, inheriting the tradition of Moslam government, which accorded extensive rights to religious minorities, would be prepared to give the most generous treatment to the Jews living in Palestine as soon as they abandoned their ambition to establish an independent Jewish State.

(H. BEELEY)

4th October, 1947.

PALESTINE

E 9728 20 OCT

Registry \ 9728/95-1/3/

1947

FROM

U.K. Del.

No.

Dated

New York. & P.M. won

Received in Registry 14,00 F

U.S. Alaborent on Palistine. M' Herderson, during commented enthant Knox directed M' Herrchel To hison's elotions in particular the partogs referring to take noveres of transition to independence.

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would be a difficult last

Last Paper

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References

(Print)

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(Minutes.)

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N.A. Dell. 25/10

(Action completed)

Next Paper

9757

14th October, (94) teel. 17. 18 With the compliments of the 28 United Kingdom Delegation 20he Onted Nations assembly. Taskin See the war P. Mason, beg.

UN. (Pol) Dept,

Foreign office

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Committee I Distribution. 13th October, 1947.

- nent, asked me what was the reaction of the United Kingdom Delegation to Mr. Herschel Johnson's statement that morning on Palestine. I said I did not know, but took the opportunity of asking him, on a personal basis, to elucidate for my information one or two points in the statement.
- 2. I asked him about the phrase:

"The General Assembly did not, by admitting this item to its agenda, undertake to assume responsibility for the administration of Palestine during the process of transition to independence. Responsibility for the government of Palestine now rests with the mandatory power ..."

I asked him what sort of length of time the United States administration had in mind for "the process of transition to independence" and whether it was intended that the implementation of the UNSCOP partition plan should take place within the transition period.

- have to be considered; but he seemed to think that the United States Government were thinking of what he called an "interim period" of about six months, during which time the details of partition would be worked out. After that, the British forces would withdraw and immediately the separate Jewish and Arab States would come into being. Upon being pressed, he said that the United States Government seriously thought that British forces could withdraw and the two States enter upon separate and peaceful lives "almost overnight". In fact, he did not envisage that "implementation" would be a difficult task.
- I then asked him about the United States offer of assistance. Did this imply that the United States Government would be prepared to send Government forces to maintain "law and order" during the transition period? He replied with an emphatic No. The United States Government had no intention of sending troops to Palestine. It was for this reason that they had suggested "A special constabulary or police force".
- I asked whether the United States Government considered that there should be any restriction on those joining this force. For instance, /would

would Jews and Arabs be allowed to serve? Mr. Knox said that he saw no reason for any restriction. The United States Government thought that the force should be composed of all those volunteering to serve. As a parallel, he mentioned the hired Hessian soldiers who had fought against the American Army in the War of Independence. (Mr. Man learned to-day that the United States Government hope that the police force will be officered by British officers with experience of the country).

- The above views of Mr. Knox are extremely naive. They may not correspond to those of the draftsmen of the United States statement. I report them as evidence:
 - (a) of the absence of thinking on this subject by the State Department, and
 - (b) of the fact that United States policy on this subject, defined apparently outside the State Department, does not intend paying much heed to the convenience of His Majesty's Government.

(Signed) J. N. Henderson

I may add to the above that Mr. Wadsworth, of the United States Delegation, in drawing my attention to the assumption made in the Russian statement that our Administration would leave Palestine early in the transition period, seemed to think that this would be unwelcome to us.

(Signed) H. Beeley
14th October, 1947.

PALESTINE

E 9757
20 OCT

Registry | E 9757/151/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. M' Pandas

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Dated Received in Registry

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very reliable source informs that only 500

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Last Paper.

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(Action completed.)

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Next Paper.

971-9

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas No. 456 18th October, 1947

D. 7.27 p.m. 18th October, 1947
R. 8.50 p.m. 18th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem, Beirut and to Amman Saving.

SECRET

My telegram No. 445.

E 9757

A very reliable source informs me that there are only 500 to 800 troops at present in the Quality area including one armoured car squadron, one weak battallon of infantry and two troops of light [grp.undec.] [grp.undec.?cavalry]. Normal frontier cavalry patrol has been brought up to strength.

Repeated Beirut as my totegram No. 30.

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61883

OFFICE,

9759

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PALESTINE

20 OCT

TELEGRAM FROM

No. IN Poly feets.

Dated
Received in Registry 19, 0 of

20 -

Polistal Committee Meetings. 17th Report (I 1959 (E 9711/95-1/21)

Kintoh was only specific of 19th meeting and living menting the last of the 18th meeting to the Higher Committee were offered second enning on first day, and first on mound day, but Jamot Hurrisini dietil to speak and only one, fine for fire free thes.

Last Paper.

971-7

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Oct-22

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(Action completed.)

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Next Paper.

9761

(Minutes.)

Para 4. We iz mann seems to realise that he cannot vely on us to impose a devish state. In the last resort he trinks the dews themselves plus an international force wind be able to de the necessary.

Januar 21/x BMS

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2984.

D. 1.16 p.m. 19th October, 1947.

19th October, 1947.

R. 7.50 p.m. 19th October, 1947.

Repeated to High Commissioner Jerusalem, Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT.

My telegram No. 2959.

Palestine Committee.

E 9759

20 OCT

Shertok was the only speaker at the 17th meeting on the 17th October and Weizmann the last at the 18th meeting on the 18th. The Arab Higher Committee was offered the second innings on the first day and the first on the second but Jamal Husseini elected to speak only once.

Shertok described as "the two focal points" in the controversy that Palestine was the only country in which the Jewish people could hope to attain statehood and that the Arabs of Palestine were not a people but a fraction of a larger unit. After dealing with a number of historical arguments he claimed that the Charter could be quoted as effectively in support of the Zionists as of the Arab case. Jewish men and women could not attain equal rights with others unless the Jewish people were placed on a footing of equality with other peoples. They too could invoke the principle of self-determination. Referring to the Arab argument that the future of Palestine should be separated from the resettlement of displaced persons he noted that no Arab State had yet joined I.R.O. The Jewish Agency had decided with a heavy heart to give full consideration to the plan of the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority. They had proposals to make on the boundaries and other aspects of the scheme and hoped for an opportunity to present these at a sub-committee. The area proposed for the Jewish State was, with certain modifications the indispensable minimum. The Agency had modifications the indispensable minimum. been greatly heartened by the American and Russian statements. The Colonial Secretary's second speech "may or may not have opened a door which his former pronouncement seemed to have practically closed". The United Kingdom had a chance of concluding honourably the chapter of history

they/



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they had initiated with the Balfour declaration. If they took this chance a great deal of the bitterness of recent years would be forgotten.

Husseini began by denying that the Arabs were flouting the Charter - what they were doing was to assert the sacred right of self-defence, itself recognised by the Charter. Nobody had the right to give away their land to a foreign people. Husseini then produced historical authorities in support of the contention challenged by the Zionist spokemmen that the Ashkenazi Jews are not Semitic and consequently not descended from the Palestinian Jews of the Old Testament. Next he defended the Mufti (not unskilfully) and quoted tributes paid by Churchill and Truman to the war effort of the Arab States. The Jewish Agency insulted the Jewish soldiers who had fought for their various countries by suggesting that they had fought in order to be rewarded by the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Soviet delegate had invoked the right of self-determination on behalf of the Jewish minority there, but its concession to them involved denying it to nearly as many Arabs. A Jewish State of a million people would have no chance of survival in the heart of the Arab world, and the Arabs of Palestine would never agree under any pressure to part with any portion of their country. It seemed that "other powers were now labouring under the same illusions" that had caused the British so much trouble. But he did not believe that the present policy of the United States Government represented the true feeling of the American people who would come to see that the enforcement of partition was neither in their interests nor consistent with their traditions.

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RECORD OFFICE,

4. Weizmann, who had difficulty in reading his typescript, said he had been disappointed to hear that he was not a Jew. After speaking of the origin and intentions of the mandate he said he had long believed that partition was the only practicable compremise. It was not a departure from the mandate but its inevitable consumnation. The question before the Committee was: by whom should the Jewish community be governed - by a Trustee, by the arabs or by itself? Trusteeship was no longer feasible. The great services rendered by Britain "in helping to lay the foundations of Jewish independence" would be remembered when the sordid consequences of the White Paper were forgotten. He was encouraged by the Colonial Secretary's second speech to hope for British participation in bringing the project to a noble conclusion. The second alternative that the Jews should be a minority in an Arab State was morally impossible. A national unit could not be subjected to another people by force in the name of majority rule. Arab Jewish co-operation would be possible only when the Jewish people had attained an equal status. He asked the Committee to consider medifications of the U.N.S.C.O.P. majeraty plan netably in respect of Western Galilee and the Jewish district of Jerusalem. In considering the problem of implementation he asked them to take full account of "the assistance which our own people can give in making the Jewish State capable of its own defence". They did not anticipate or fear aggression but they hoped the Jewish forces would be "accompanied at the outset by an international force to symbolise the consent and decision of the United Nations".

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to High CommissionerJerusalem as my telegram No.104.

[Cepies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

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E 9761 20 OCT

PALESTINE

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Last Paper.

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References.

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(Action completed.)

E9768

(Minutes.)

Mui suggestion is rather similar to Lord Samuels proposals, which were recently the subject of comment by Co and UN. (Pol.) Dept. But it does not Square win para. 9 of N. York tel. No. 2983 and is apparently a garbled account The Fyrin delægates resolution. I submit a draft reply. B. J. Beins

> Now See draft on E 9780 which deals with time point JB ort. 22

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas No. 452 D. 3.42 p.m. 17th October, 1947

R. 5.41 p.m. 17th October, 1947

17th October, 1947
Repeated United Kingdom Delegation New York
Arabs posts Saving

9761

SECRET

I have learnt very confidentially from sprefficial of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that telegram was yesterday received from Faris Khoury informing Jamil Mardam of the resolution which the Syrian delegation had tabled at Lake Success calling on his Majesty's Government to place Palestine under United Nations trusteeship until full independence is granted. This telegram was the first news that the Prime Minister received of the Syrian resolution and the proposals had never been considered by Jamil or other members of the Syrian Government.

2. It is possible that the Syrian President has sent instructions to Faris Khoury which are not known to Jamil and I hope to report on this later. Meanwhile I should be glad to have your instructions as to what line I should take towards the Syrian resolution.

Please pass to New York as my telegram No. 4.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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E9780

White 12 to 12 to

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

D. 2.00 p.m. 18th October 1947 9768
R. 8.16 p.m. 18th October 1947

18th October 1947

Repeated to Washington (Saving)

20 OCT

IMMEDIATE

Fellowing for Trafford Smith, Colonial Office from Martin.

My telegram No. 2955. [275-6/-020/2)

Lebanese Delegation has submitted to Ad Hoc Committee, statement referring to press reports of concentration of 50,000 immigrants in Black Sea perts, and prepesing adeption of fellowing Resolution before discussion of any other Resolutions before Committee:

"The General Assembly recognising the danger that assistance, in transport arms and money, to immigrants destined for Palestine is calculated to accentuate the existing tension in that country and to endanger peace in the Middle East, recommends that the Governments members of the United Nations refrain, and prohibit their nationals, from giving assistance in any form whatsoever to the said immigrants."

[Cepies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for addressee and to Middle Rest Secretariat]

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8) Pr. Parhieson 20. 17.0.4. 18.1.3a. Admity. A.M. Oct. 28

See Eq 780 | 951/31

Note on the suggested attitude to be adopted by the United Kingdom Delegation towards the various resolutions on Palestine contained in New York telegrams Nos. 2983 and 2992.

Colombian Resolution calling upon the peoples of Palestine to bring acts of violence to an early end.

Approve.

Salvadorian Resolution calling upon the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee to appoint three representatives each to meet in conference to find common grounds of agreement and to report to the General Assembly the resolution of the meeting - the recommendations in the report to contain adequate safeguards for religious interests.

This is clearly impracticable and we should abstain.

United Kingdom Resolution that each member of the United Nations should adopt urgent measures for settling a fair share of displaced persons and refugees, etc., etc.,

This is our own suggestion.

Yugoslav Resolution that Jewish refugees now in Cyprus camps shall be admitted to Palestine immediately.

This plan would be administratively convenient to the Colonial Office but would be inacceptable to the Arabs and would run counter to our present declared policy on immigration. We should abstain.

Uruguayan Resolution that immediate entry be granted into Palestine to thirty thousand Jewish children, their mothers and fathers, and pregnant women at present in displaced persons' camps and in Cyprus and other places of detainment or assembly.

Same considerations apply as to number 4. We should abstain.

Lebanese Resolution recommending that 6. the Governments of member States refrain from and prohibit nationals from giving assistance in any form to immigrants (sic) destined for be amended to Palestine.

This must refer to illegal immigrants and on that basis we should approve.

Iraqi Resolution referring to the 7. International Court of Justice for an advisory

/opinion

opinion under Article 96 of the Charter on the alleged pledges given by Great Britain to the Shereef Hussein of Mecca and subsequent declarations.

This is merely an attempt to drag out the proceedings and we should abstain.

Egyptian Resolution referring to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether the General Assembly are competent to recommend either of the UNSCOP plans and whether member States are entitled to implement either solution without the consent of the people of Palestine.

This seems to question the whole validity of taking the Palestine problem to the United Nations and we should oppose.

Syrian Resolution recommending that the United Kingdom accept a trusteeship for the purpose of the transition period between the termination of the mandate and the transfer of power to the new Government of Palestine.

We have concurred in the line taken by the Delegation i.e. that for us to administeratrusteeship for Palestine would be contrary to the Colonial Secretary's two declarations of policy, provided it is made clear that we are not going back on our undertaking to put into effect a solution agreed between Arabs and Jews.

- Netherlands Resolution recommending 10. that the Committee closely co-ordinate its efforts to draft
 - (a) proposals for a fair and practicable solution of the Palestine question as far as possible acceptable to both parties involved
 - (b) recommendations for the adequate and effective implementation of this solution, and
 - (c) recommendations for an early solution of the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons.

This is quite unexceptionable and lays valuable emphasis on (b) and (c). We should approve.

United States and Swedish Resolution 11. accepting the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the Majority Plan of the Special Committee on Palestine as a basis for its recommendations concerning the future Government of Palestine.

In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the majority recommendations of UNSCOP we cannot approve this resolution. It is not

/easy

MARGIN THIS Z WRITTEN 10

-2-

easy to decide whether to abstain or to oppose it. It may be argued that to abstain, in view of our special experience of Palestine, would be disingenuous and unhelpful. It would be tantamount to voting against the resolution but would not gain us corresponding credit with the Arabs. On the other hand if we oppose the resolution, we should be involved in a detailed discussion of the plan's merits and would be more or less forced to suggest an alternative.

On balance it is recommended that we abstain and stick to our contention that any resolution of this kind must take into account the method of implementation.

12. United States Resolution to establish a sub-committee to draw up a detailed plan in accordance with the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the Majority Plan and to transmit it to the Ad Hoc Committee not later than October 27th.

We should abstain for the same reasons as given under 11. but might add that we could approve such a resolution provided it incorporated the Canadian suggestion under 13.

above the following: "To consider the exercise of administrative responsibility in Palestine during the transitional period, including the possibility of the application of chapter XII of the Charter" and "to consider the method by which the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question would be put into effect".

We should approve.

14. mending

<u>Uruguayan Resolution</u> (No. 2) recom-

- (a) that the Ad Hoc Committee adopt as a basis for discussion the Majority Reportof the Special Committee on Palestine
- (b) that proposals may be submitted or amendments proposed on questions of substance throughout the period for which the matter is under consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee.

The resolution also contains various detailed suggestions for an economic union, the administration of Palestine during the transitional period and the modification of the boundaries recommended in the Majority Report.

We should abstain as regards (a) see note on 11. The Delegation should be given
discretion as regards voting on the other
points if they come up separately, since they
are entirely procedural.

(i) termination of the transitional period not later than September

ist, 1949,

(ii) the replacement of the mandatory power by the United Nations as administrating authority during the transitional period

(iii) the setting up of an international police force.

As this involves approval of the Majority Plan we should abstain.

tablish a Special Committee to study the observations contained in the UNSCOP report regarding the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and to prepare draft proposals as to the manner in which member States could contribute most effectively to the solution of that problem.

We should approve.

the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter and chapter IV of the Statute of the Court on various legal points arising from the mandate in connexion with partition.

As we do not wish to give the impression that we have anything to conceal as regards the mandate, although the resolution seems to be merely playing with time, we should abstain rather than oppose.

[Agreed with co.]

M. s. Reins Mr. 23 NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FlagB

We have been left surprisingly in the dark about procedure on Palestine in New York. have been told in New York telegram No. 2983 of a number of resolutions submitted to the Committee, but we have not had any views from the Delegation about them or any request for instructions about the attitude they should adopt, except on the single case of the Syrian resolution referred to in New York telegram No. Some of the resolutions raise important 3002. questions of principle which are not properly covered by the existing instructions to the Delegation. We are considering the resolutions with the Colonial Office and I hope to submit a paper very shortly. But meanwhile we ought to send New York a telegram with reference to their No. 3002 and we should take the opportunity at the same time to ask them to be a little more communicative.

I attach a draft.

22nd October, 1947.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION. 20 OCT

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations,

No. 2983 October 18th, 1947. D. 10.23 p.m. October 18th, 1947. R. 9.59 a.m. October 19th, 1947.

Repeated to High Commissioner Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

Please pass to Colonial Office.

Following is a summary of the 15 formal resolutions which have so far been submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question and on which discussion will begin next week. Full texts of all these resolutions have been sent by air bag.

- 1. Colombia. Calling upon the peoples of Palestine to bring acts of violence to an early end.
- 2. El Salvador calling upon the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee to appoint three representatives each to meet in conference to find common grounds of agreement and to report to the General Assembly the results of the meeting - the recommendations in the report to contain adequate safeguards for religious interests.
- 3. United Kingdom recommending that each member of the United Nations adopt urgent measures for settling a fair share of displaced persons and refugees in its country, inform the Secretary General of the results of the consideration given to receiving in conformity with the principles of the I.R.O. its fair share of non repatriable persons, and join through the I.R.O. in the development of everall plans.
- Yugoslavia recommending that Jewish refugees now in Cyprus camps shall be admitted to Palestine immediately.
- Uruguay that immediate entry be granted into Palestine to 30,000 Jewish children their mothers and fathers and pregnant women at present in displaced persons camps and in Cyprus and other places of detention or assembly.
- 6. Lebanon recommending that the Governments of Member States refrain and prohibit nationals from giving assistance in any form to immigrants destined for Palestine.
- 7. Iraq to refer the following legal point to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter.

"Did not the pledges given by Great Britain to the Shereef Hussein of Mecca and her subsequent declarations promises and assurances to the Arabs that in the event of Wallied victory the Arab countries would obtain their Phospendence include Palestine and its inhabitants?".

Egypt.

(1) To refer to the International Jourt

tice for an advisory opinion the questions a

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whether (a) it lies within the competence of the General Assembly to recommend any of the two solutions proposed by the majority or by the minority of U.N.S.C.O.P. and (b) it lies within the rights of any Member States or group of Member States to implement any of the proposed solutions without the consent of the people of Palestine.

- (2) Upon receipt of the Courts opinion the General Assembly to resume its examination of this phase of the Palestine question.
- 9. Syria recommends that the United Kingdom prepare an agreement under Article 79 of the Charter and submit it for approval to the General Assembly authorising Great Britain, as administering authority, to complete her task in Palestine during the transition period between the termination of the mandate and the transfer of power to the new Government of Palestine this agreement to contain provision for the establishment of a sovereign State for the whole of Palestine on a democratic basis and for the election of Constituent Assembly and the enactment of a constitution on the lines of the new familiar Arab plan.
- ordinate its efforts to draft (a) proposals for a fair and practicable solution of the Palestine question as far as possible acceptable to both parties involved (b) recommendations for the adequate and effective implementation of this solution and (c) recommendations for an early solution of the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons.

11. United States and Sweden:

To accept the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan of the special committee on Palestine as a basis for its recommendations concerning the future Government of Palestine.

12. United States:

To establish a Sub Committee

- Government of Palestine in accordance with the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan
- (2) To incorporate this plan in the form of recommendations and
- Ad Hos Committee on the Palestinian question not later than 27th October.

13. Canada:

of the Sub Committee proposed in the United States resolution at 12 above. "To consider the exercise of administrative responsibility in Palestine during the transitional period, including the possibility of the application of Chapter XII of the Charter" and "to consider methods by which the recommendations of the Ad Hoe Committee on the Palestinian question would be put into effect".

14. Uruguay

- (a) That the Ad Hoc Committee adopt as a basis for discussion the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine
- (b) That proposals may be submitted or amendments proposed on questions of substance throughout the period for which the matter is under consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Uruguay resolution also contains proposals for modification of the boundaries recommended in the majority report for the setting up of a sub committee to study the plan for economic union, this sub committee to have the coperation of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in its work and for transfer by the mandatory Power to the United Nations of the administration of Palestine during the transitional period, the United Nations to exercise its authority through a provisional council consisting of five members, three appointed by the General Assembly from citizens of Member States and two to be appointed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee.

- 15. Guatemala: to recommend that the General Assembly appreve the majority plan, subject to amendments providing
- (1) termination of the transitional period not later than 1st September 1949 either of the States to have the right within this period to request its independence if it can prove that it has complied with the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of recommendation (a) in Chapter VI of the U.N.S.C.O.P. report.
- United Nations as administering authority during the transition period, the authority to be exercised through a body of three delegates elected by the General Assembly from nationals of States members other than the five permanent members of the Security Council
- (3) the setting up of an international police force to ensure order during the transitional period, this force to be composed of military contingents from States Members other than permanent members of the Security Council the contingents to be composed preferably of volunteers but the contingents to be composed preferably of volunteers but until such are available to be drawn from the regular forces of the States members
- (4) the numbers and composition of this force to be fixed by the administering delegates
- (5) the cost of the force to be borne by the five permanent members of the Security Council
 - (6) the States Members of the United Nations to /take

take "such measures as the Charter prescribes, in the event of either the Arab or the Jewish people attempting to disturb the peace and take measures against any State or States which after to-day's date commit any act of aggression against either of the peoples of Palestine".

Fereign Office please pass to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No. 103.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section. Colonial Office]

22221

61883 LON DON U.K. Delegation, New York.

Telegram.

No. 3614.

(Date) OCT. 22

Repeal to:
Washington.
No. 10984.
Damascus.
No. 539

Co conur

13.5. Dent 04.22

En Clait. Godexx Cypher.

Distribution:

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Copies to :-

OUT FILE

F. O.,

22/10 1947.

Despatched 9 45 M.

Your telegram No. 3002 / of October 21st: Syrian resolution on Palestine 7.

we agree with the line you are taking provided it is made absolutely clear that we hold to our undertaking to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any plan on which agreement is reached between the Arabs and the Jews. It does not however appear that any trustee-ship agreement would be required for the above purpose.

- 2. The above is being repeated to Damascus for the guidance of H.M. Chargé d'Affaires.
- sidering the resolution repeated in your telegrams Nos. 2983 and 2992 and in particular Nos. 11 and 12. You will presumably require guidance from us in regard to voting on these resolutions and it will be convenient to have your preliminary observations before sending final instructions. In this connection we should particularly like to know more about the general procedure which is adopted since the close of the convenient about the general procedure which is adopted since the close of the clo

CAN!

7t. 43697-140 100m *3147

13/miles

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E. 9780/951/31 Confidential

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3614.

D. 9.45. p.m. 22nd October 1947.

22nd October 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 10924.

Damascus No. 539.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 3002 [of October 21st: Syrian resolution on Palestine.]

We agree with the line you are taking provided it is made clear that we are not going back on our undertaking to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any plan on which agreement is reached between the Arabs and the Jews. It does not however appear that any trustee-ship agreement would be required for the above purpose.

- 2. The above is being repeated to Damasous for the guidance of His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires.
- 7. [Not to Damascus] We are considering the resolutions reported in your telegrams Nos. 2983 and 2992 and in particular Nos. 11 and 12. You will presumably require guidance from us in regard to voting on the more important resolutions and it will be convenient to have important resolutions and it will be convenient to have your preliminary observations before sending final views. You preliminary observations before sending final views. In this connexion we should particularly like to know the more about the procedure which is being adopted since the close of the general debate.

.

Frot Klawas

5 My Swin

16 Oct,

(Print)

21 OCT PALESTINE Commatan with there Bey alami all Muja Rey alami at denies, who said, after much commonlant commentar, sechan ander would, fight & resist the superity non that if partition remain about, it Le further gave list of what there

9784

(Minutes.) Boly to c.o. (Mr. Mullian) and murden P/L to: U.K. Del to U.W. I have sent a copy to Mr Beeley (J. E. CABLE)

> the S/S has mus tranked. P.J. agnes to distribution abore.

> > of sa Beins

From what I know of Mura alumi his attitude would be, "If partition commothe worded then it must be on clubain candi hours. I believe that he also holds the view that in that event, the arab part of Palestine should be attached

& Cynin rulter than Viansperdan. The conditions which Wasa Clami gives are, of course, most important fram the arab haint of view, but ille (a) will of course be impossible without some four of continued fareible control of immigration ench es All fout are now exercising and it is the United Nations will sleave never be the able or even willing Ito energiese such concilee control. (6) and (1) would be difficult, but not necessarily infossible to enforce. could at frast begin fairly sensible discussions with Musa et Alami Vie important que tou. which 1.0. & Jerusalem yffean to differ, is the extent of his if lucure. At present we can only note his views & maintain occasional contact with him.

M Henniher

Von were asking her tons

11 biere am Objection to

letting Co and Arrord

Buelly see to Copies?

Bort. 21

Es No, none, Attuck

The

FO 371 61883

rence

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Phrasoler Square, W. 8 My dear Foverpi Genetary: E 9:84) 2 Let ICI denie the other mefet next to Husa Bey Alami, who runs the Arab Information. Officies, and may be presumed to know the views 1 the Arab heagne. After some commonflace conversation, such as that the Arabs would fight to resist the majority plan, le said, "Il partition somes about, it will have the on certain conditions.) tecked up us ean, as this was the first time I had heard an Arab envisage the fissibility of partition.) said thin that the seemed true important, as

I had not previously found Arabs willing even to

descris the possibily of partition as a volution. He

ded not descent, but went on to descent the

conditions he had in maid, which included:

ference FO 371 61883

(a) no possibility of the Tens using the Tensih the area a means of animited immigration;

(b) an exchange of population on the basis of one Ten for one Arab no that as for as possible there would be no Tens in the Arab State and no Arab in the Tensih State;

(c) the necessary exchange I land to be whather worsould not price the Tens an excuse for further immigration.

This demin took flace the night the Russian view, pollowing the American, became known, and Husa Bey may have been influenced by their decesion in favour of partition. But From clearly more than a personal view, and I feel it proper to

2.000T 1947

Jun maiel,

Von Thomas

Re M. Hon. Great Devin, M.P.



OUT FILE

64

22nd October, 1947.

SECRET.

My dear Ivor,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th October about Palestine.

I have read it with interest.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ERILLY BEVIN

Ivor Thomas, Esq., M.P.



But at the same line the dragis, and the other Arabs, should be encouraged to face up to realibles, and june no reason to believe that me will be prepared to withdraw "in accordance with arrangements between All Gout. and the arab States. It might be as well to send a elegnour to Middle East posts instructing Mun to discourage this consechtion.

Rin has now deen overtaken in later de velspmenti.

the min free how this the can handle but

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

D TO FOREIGN OFFICE handle this buildement

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

SB.

D. 6. 47 a.m. 20th October, 1947. Mr Evans Pelham No. 965 18th October, 1947. R. 9. 09 a.m. 20th October, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Cairo B.H.E.O. Cairo Saving Damascus Saving. Beirut Saving Amman Saving Jedda Saving Jerusalem Saving

RISTRICTID

My telegram No. 918.

Reactions in Iraq to the American and Russian support for partition of Palestine are angry, alarmed and confused.

- The Government have expressed their reaction to statement of Mr Johnson by refusing to receive the American Congressmen (see my telegram No. 955). The more irresponsible press advocates holy war, rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States and an embargo on her air lincs.
- In the case of Russia, press comment has been equally strong, no less than six newspapers are in favour of violent action, and one of them proposes that such action should be immediate. One paper attributes Russian support for Zionisa to the possibility that immigration affords for infiltration of Communism. I have heard this view expressed frequently in official circles.
- 4. The opponents of Communism have consoled themselves with the set back that Russia's action is likely to cause to the spread of Communism in Arab countries The more violent anti [gp undec] s of extreme Right such as [gp undec] Party showed some disappointment. They had previously been foremost in urging the Arabs to turn to Russia.
- Disillusionment with United Nations has increased Enough of these international charters and promises" says one newspaper.

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6. All of these reactions are largely unthinking, responsible men are engaged in trying to forecast [gp undec] attitude of His Majesty's Government. They believe that Britain will no withdraw and leave a vacuum and they are hoping against hope that withdrawal will take place in accordance with arrangements between His Majesty's Government and Arab States. (c.f. Beirut telegram No. 720, paragraph 2). Even amongst responsible editors however there appears to be little appreciation of the fact that the Jews of Palestine amount in themselves to a formidable force and they cling to a belief that the Arabs can deal with Yishuv given neutralization of United States and benevolent neutrality of His Majesty's Government.


Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 13.

[Repeated to U.K.Del. New York]

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AMENDMENT SELF

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

Telegram No. 965 of 18th October from Bagdad to Foreign Office.

Paragraph 4 line 4 should read: "The more violent anti-Imperialists of the extreme Right such as the Istiqual party showed some disappointment."

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

23rd October, 1947.

Sy.

24 OCT | 94

Reference FO 371 61883

HI OF THE FUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LO

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 9799

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr Evens
D. 6. 47 a.m. 20th October, 1947.

No. 965
18th October, 1947. R. 9. 09 a.m. 20th October, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
Cairo B.M.E.O.
Cairo Saving
Damascus Saving
Beirut Saving
Amman Saving
Jedda Saving
Jerusalem Saving

RESTRICTED

My telegram No. 918.

Reactions in Iraq to the American and Russian support for partition of Palestine are angry, alarmed and confused.

- 2. The Government have expressed their reaction to statement of Mr Johnson by refusing to receive the American Congressmen (see my telegram No. 955). The more irresponsible press advocates holy war, rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States and an embargo on her air lines.
- gually strong, no less than six newspapers are in favour of violent action, and one of them proposes that such action should be immediate. One paper attributes Russian support for Zionism to the possibility that immigration affords for infiltration of Communism. I have heard this view expressed frequently in official circles.
- selves with the set back that Russia's action is likely to cause to the spread of Communism in Arab countries. The more violent anti [gp undec] s of extreme Right such as [gp undec] Party showed some disappointment. They had previously been foremost in urging the Arabs to turn to Russia.
- 5. Disillusionment with United Nations has increased "Emough of these international charters and promises" says one newspaper.

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OFFICE,


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6. All of these reactions are largely unthinking, responsible men are engaged in trying to forecast [gp undec] attitude of His Majesty's Government. They believe that Britain will notwithdraw and leave a vacuum and they are hoping against hope that withdrawal will take place in accordance with arrangements between His Majesty's Government and Arab States. (c.f. Beirut telegram No. 720, paragraph 2). Even amongst responsible editors however there appears to be little appreciation of the fact that the Jews of Palestine amount in themselves to a formidable force and they cling to a belief that the Arabs can deal with Yishuv given neutralization of United States and benevolent neutrality of His Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 13.

[Repeated to U.K.Del. New York]

2 2 2 2



5 9507

En clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE! OCT

Mr. Bowker No. 2037

D. 11.20 a.m. 20th October, 1947.

20th October, 1947.

R. 1.50 p.m. 20th October, 1947.

Repeated to : Moscow Amman

Saving (Jerusalem

Bagd ad Beirut Jedds.

Following summaries Arabic press comment on Russian declaration of support of partition of Palestine.

United States Government has played into Moscow's hands by suggesting international police force for Palestine. Article argues that Russians have skilfully ensured their entry into Middle East for indefinite period since they will evidently participate in international police force. Article concludes by saying this is cruel but salutary deception for Arab countries since it dispels their illusion, created by Russian attitude [? in] Egyptian case, that Russia was their friend and champion of independence.

- 8. 'Mokattam' of 15th October considers Russia's attitude was to be expected in view of line Poland had taken owing, 'Mokattam' suggests, to desire to rid herself of Jews. If Russia happens to side with Arabs' causes, she only does so in her own interests.
- 3. 'Assas' of 16th October remarks that, although declared enemies, United States and Russia are for once in agreement on Palestine question. Alleges that their attitude to Palestine and indeed whole Arab orient proves that spirit of Nazism is still alive, its new victim being the small States. Russia has now lost sympathy of East which she had won affew weeks earlier. Indeed she has lost more than the United States since United States had been accused of being under Zionist influence for years. From Russian attitude on Security Council Arabs had thought of her as on their side. How great was their deception when it was found that her Government too had imbibed spirit of Nazism.
- 4. 'Ikhwan-el-Muslimeen' of 15th October considers that Arabs will welcome perms that Russia supports the partition of Palestine with lively satisfaction. British and Americans had always alleged that Arab movements for independence were not due to political maturity but caused by foreign hands, their allusion being to Russia. They even said that OCT Middle East must remain under yoke of imperialism so that this strategic zone should be pretected against Communication.

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LON DON

Now

New it is clear, concludes article, that Arabs have leaned neither to Right nor to Left, that their movement in Palestine is essentially Arab and that no foreign hand is behind it.

- 5. Same paper of 17th October carried lengthy article arguing that Russia's support of Egyptian cause in Security Council was only political move aimed against British so that Russia might gain strategic outlet in Mediterranean. Article sums up Russia's aims [? om.] imposing Jews on Palestineas -
 - (A) to cause revolution in Arab world following United Nations' approval of partition scheme;
 - (B) to everthrow British mandate;
 - (C) to secure participation of Russian force in international police force sent to Palestine in event of enforcement of partition scheme; and
 - (D) destruction of Eastern Mediterranean Front which democracy had welcomed as bulwark against Russian expansion.
- 6. 'Sheala' of 17th October, after publishing report from New York correspondent to effect that Russia aims by this move at destruction of Anglo-Saxon bloc, warns Arabs against those Powers who pretend to show sympathy for them while out to achieve their own ends.
- 7. 'Achberel-Yem' considers Russian attitude stab in back for Arabs.

M

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| 1947 | PALESTINE | 21 001 |
| Registry £ 9806/957/3/. TELEGRAM FROM No. 2979 Dated Received in Registry 1800/21 ~ | Refer to bit to bairo 1) Laur aceus un proba question recs emerges but pent form a not he pendand | 925-16/91 |
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Cypher/OTP

DEPAR MENTAL NO. 1 OCT

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2977

D. 4.00 p.m. 18th October, 1947

18th October, 1947. R. 6.16 p.m. 18th October, 1947

Please pass to Jerusalem.

[Begins].

Addressed to High Commissioner Palestine telegram No. 102 of 18th October.

Top Secret.

Personal for Gurney from MacGillivray.

Your telegram No. 1923.

Press reports may have led you to suppose that there has been much activity here behind the scenes of which the High Commissioner has not been kept informed; in fact during the period of the general debate just concluded, accounts of which have been sent daily to the High Commissioner, this has not been so, at least on the part of United Kingdom Delegation which, in adherence to the terms under which the matter was referred to the United Nations has been obliged, while keeping an ear close on the ground, to take a somewhat passive role at this early stage. Assume High Commissioner received the Secretary of State's Tep Secret and Personal telegram of 7th October; he will new also have received the more up to date appreciation of the position which is contained in the Secretary of State's telegrams from here Nos. 97 and 98 of 17th October; and he will have seen Fereign Office telegram to Caire No. 1925. There is really nothing to add. As to the likely course of future events your guess is as good as ours. All that can at present be discerned through the feg is the emergence of a Jewish state in some shape; but how and just when it will come into being cannot yet be judged. The Jewish Agency appear confident that they will obtain a two-thirds majority in favour of partition in the Assembly; the Arabs on the other hand claim to have rallied sixteen negative vetes and hope to obtain additions to this number or abstentions sufficient to secure its rejection. If the vote were to be taken new it would undoubtedly be a close affair, but the situation may change in the next few weeks in the course of the detailed study in sub-committees of the implications of partition of which till new some members, who have declared themselves in favour in principle, have only a superficial acquaintance. In any event the Jewish Agency do not seem to be in the least optimistic (and this lack of optimism is shared by most delegations) that, should a plan of partition be

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
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adepted in the Assembly, an effective instrument of enforcement will be agreed upon and brought into being by the United Nations in time to replace the present British Administration. Nevertheless they would still wish it would seem despite the absence of means of enforcement to have the general blessing of the Assembly to a plan of partition provided it was generally as favourable to them as that recommended by U.N.S.C.O.P.; for then with the moral support of the United Nations and possibly active support from some individual member states, they would be able themselves to give effect to the plan so long as they were to keep within the boundaries approved. Their great present anxiety appears to be lest the withdrawal of British forces should take place in such a way as to give the Arabs a strategical advantage: they are watching closely for any indication of such intention.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jeruslane].

1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference Public RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference O 371 61883



Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2986

D. 10.55 a.m. 20th October, 1947

20th October, 1947.

R. 5.25 p.m. 20th October, 1947

Repeated to High Commissioner Palestine Washington Saving

49 prepared speeches were made in the general debate on Palestine, the 6 Arab States contributing 14 of them. Of the 31 delegations which spoke 14 declared themselves for partition and 12 against while the remaining 5 (including the United Kingdom) were non-committal. Judging from lobby gossip the proportion of silent delegations which favour partition is higher than those against.

Foreign Office please pass to Colonial Office and to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 105.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].



Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

E 9845

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

22 OCT

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2992

D. 5.35 p.m. 20th October 1947

20th October 1947

R. 8.30 a.m. 21st October, 1947.

Repeated to High Commissioner Jerusalen Washington Saving

GIANT

Please pass to Colonial Office.

Add following to summary of Resolutions contained in my telegram No. 2983.

16. Colombia. To establish a sub-Committee to study the observations contained in the U.N.S.C.O.P. report with regard to the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and to prepare draft proposals tas to the manner in which Member States could contribute most effectively to the solution of that problem.

17. Syria. To request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court on the following questions:

- (1) Are the terms of the Act of Mandate consistent with the Covenant of the League especially its paragraph 4 Article 22 and with the fundamental rights of peoples and their rights of self determination and international law?
- (2) Is a possible plan of partition consistent with the objects of the Mandate and with the principles of the Charter and with the ultimate fate of mandated territories referred to in Chapter XII of the Charter?
- (3) Dees the plan of partition in its adoption and forcible execution fall within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.

[Ends]

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 106.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem]

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F. (5)

| | E | E 9852 |
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| | PALESTINE | 22 OCT 82 |
| Registry Number \ = 9852/957/ TELEGRAM FROM No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No | Agrican Revolution recommendades of a unitary democration the hours of the new restriction recommendades of the new restriction of a unitary democration of the new restriction of the new restriction of the order of the new to the next contains the order of the new to the next colonies of the next colonies of the next colonies of the next to the next colonies of the next to th | march trusterships for the searly establishment Mole a Palatine an Lamihai arab Plan, at that HMG could |
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| (Action completed.) Mosological Andrews Next Paper. | | |

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

Cypher/OTP

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3002 21st October, 1947 D. 11.45 a.m. 21st October, 1947 R. 6.00 p.m. 21st October, 1947

Repeated to Damascus
Washington Saving

IMPORTANT

E 9852

Damascus telegram to you No. 45222 OCT

Palestine.

The Syrian resolution recommends a trusteeship agreement providing for the early establishment of a unitary democratic state in Palestine on the lines of the now familiar Arab Plan. Without criticising the objective of this proposal we are pointing out here that we could not in any circumstances undertake to administer a trusteeship over Palestine since this would be contrary to the two declarations of policy made by the Colonial Secretary.

Foreign Office please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 5.

[Repeated to Damascus]
[Copy sent to M.E.Secretariat]

ddddddd



M.O.4

Admly,

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(Action completed.)

HEMO 2/10

Authors

Author

61883

Next Paper.

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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Cypher/OTH

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

22 OCT

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United

D. 1.43 p.m. 21st October, 1947. No. 3004.

21st October, 1947. R. 8.40 p.m. 21st October,1947.

Repeated to Washington (Saving).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Colonial Secretary.

[Begins] Your telegram No. 3577.

Our delegation and I are puzzled by the Shertok and Weizmann statement for there has been no weakening on any point made in my first address to Palestine Committee. Our position remains exactly the same. It is position remains exactly the same. It is perhaps wishful thinking on their part. It may be that for first time they realised that we were prepared to consider participation with other nations in a United Nations policy if only on the basis that we must take inte account the inherent justice of the scheme and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it.

[Ends].



(Action completed)

Next Paper



EMPIRE STATE BLDG. 61st FLOOR "NEW YÖRK 1, N. Y.

E 9860

With the complite

United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations

Assembly.

15th Cotaber 1947

Eastern Department, Foreign Office.

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I have written to the Beeley

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1.0.C.(N.Y.)(47) II 22nd Meeting. 13 & Shill have

15th October, 1947.

Freel 22.10

RECORD OF THE 22nd MEETING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DELECATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HELD AT THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING ON WEDNESDAY, 15th OCTOBER, 1947, AT 9.15 A.M.

1. REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES.

Palestine

28 CCT 1947

The Minister of State asked the Colonial Secretary whether he would be prepared to make a statement on the Palestine question.

seemed to be hardening in favour of partition and that a recommendation in this sense would probably be the final outcome. The Arabs showed no signs of relenting in their opposition. The Jews, on the other hand, were showing signs of anxiety, since they were well aware that partition could only be effective if it were enforced. Nevertheless they had so far refused to enter into any discussions with the Arabs since they feared that the chances of partition might thereby be diminished,

In the Palestine Committee there was a disposition to reconsider the boundaries recommended in the majority report, and many of the more obvious injustices had been acknowledged by various delegations. The Committee were, however, chary of facing up to the implications of enforcement, In particular, the United States took the view that the British administration should continue during the transitional period. They thought that the United Nations should give advice and financial assistance, and supervise the activities of the British administration and proceed at the same time gradually to take over the administration from the British.

Eventually the United Nations would also provide a security force. The United States were fighting shy of enforcement and they claimed that such enforcement as might be necessary would not require a major operation.

They suggested that an international police force would be enough. In our view this was both unreal and unwise. A volunteer police force would be

composed mainly of Jews and it would be inevitably weak and inexperienced. It would itself have an extremely difficult task and its very nature would render the task of the administering power, which was in any case complicated by extremism on both sides, more difficult than it was already.

The United States view was inacceptable to His Majesty's Government. It had been decided that there should be a withdrawal from Palestine and we were decided to carry out this decision after a given period. Details of withdrawal were being studied in London. The problems which revealed themselves were formidable, in many cases more so than had been thought at first and it was possible that withdrawal would take longer than had originally been foreseen. But be that as it might, it was certain that withdrawal would take place soon.

The Colonial Secretary said that he was due to make a statement on 16th October. He would emphasize the need for a more realistic approach and for a thorough going revision of the United States' proposal. He would also take the opportunity to re-state our position as regards enforcement of the final solution to be adopted.

His Majesty's Government could not identify themselves with any solution. It was because they had failed to settle the problem of Palestine that they had applied to the United Nations for advice as to the shape which the future Government of Palestine should take. They were still awaiting this advice and could therefore not take part in the discussion. To do so would require the submission of a scheme of their own which in view of the existing suspicions harboured in many parts of the world, would inevitably provoke accusations that His Majesty's Government were shirking their obligations and were seeking to secure the authority of the United Nations for their own policies.

Make it clear that His Majesty's Government would not administer Palestine on the basis of any plan which did not have the agreement of both Jews and Arabs. So far there had been no attempt on the part of either party to make the agreement of both Jews and Arabs. There could be no doubt that the only hope of solution /of the

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of the problem lay in some kind of accomodation between the two parties. It was possible, in spite of the flery talk on the Arab side, that there was some weakening in their determination to resist partition plans by force. Their attitude to date might perhaps be a manoeuvre. In any case no accommodation could be found until the United Nations had declared themselves. If his Majesty's Government considered that the solution recommended was just, they would consider whether they could participate in it in any way, but there could be no question of putting into effect the solution by themselves. In this connection it was essential that the question of enforcement and its implications should be worked out in all its details since suforcement and the question of future administration of Palestine were inseparably connected.

As regards immigration, the Colonial Secretary said that we had been embarrassed by various resolutions which had been submitted. These involve the alteration of the present quota figure for immigration into Palestine and constituted a very difficult problem. The quota could not be altered without the acquioscence of the Arabs.

The Colonial Secretary concluded his statement by saying that it was expected to close the General Debate before the end of the week. The Jewish Agency and the Arab High Commission were then to be given an opportunity to speak and sub-committees would start in the following week.

Following the Colonial Secretary's statement the Minister of State said that he thought that the Colonial Secretary should include in the statement which he was to make before the Palestine Committee a reference to the responsibility of the United States in the organisation of illegal immigration.

Some blunt language was also needed about the lack of realism of the proposals submitted by them. Dr. Evatt, he thought, was anxious to get a paper solution fairly soon. It was probable that he would get such a solution. This would be most unsatisfactory from our point of view since it would inevitably be used against us.

/As regards

As regards the Syrian resolution which proposed the continuation of the administration by the mandatory Power, the Minister of State thought it equally unrealistic. It appeared not to take into account the determination of His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine. It would involve consultation with all other parties involved, including presumably the United States and other countries with large Jewish populations. Such consultation would not only delay matters but greatly increase the difficulties in attaining a satisfactory solution.

The Attorney General expressed concern about the probable reactions to the Colonial Secretary's statement. Any discussion was unreal in the absence of a fixed date for withdrawal. The failure to explain and to emphasize the consequences of withdrawal make it more unreal still since very few of the Delegations had any idea of what these consequences would be. He thought that the attitude of His Majesty's Government was somewhat disingenuous; they were not asking for advice, they were throwing in their hand. In fact they were presenting the United Nations with an ultimatum. The Attorney General thought it essential to make the position clear to Commonwealth governments. From conversations with Commonwealth representatives he was convinced that they were unaware that we had no proposal of our own to make and he did not think that they knew how we should vote. They did not appreciate the need we felt not to alienate Arab states and did not seem to realize that British participation in any solution recommended was very unlikely.

In the discussion which followed there was general agreement with the views expressed by the Attorney General especially as regards the need for stating a date or even a target date for withdrawal. The meeting noted that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to suggest or to commit themselves to support any scheme. It was pointed out that this placed His Majesty's Government and the United Kingdom delegation in an invidious position particularly as of all the nations in the United Nations the United Kingdom alone fully understood the problems involved and alone might be able to propose a workable solution or to advise as to the best means of achieving one. It was agreed however that in fact it was very improbable that any of the solutions proposed could work and that the matter had been

/taken

Since the United Nations was an international body we could not be accused of exerting pressure or of seeking to defend our imperial interests. To submit schemes or give advice to the United Nations would entail British participation in the enforcement of any solution adopted and the responsibility was too heavy. Mr. Younger asked whether it would not be possible to lay down a date on which withdrawal would begin, if the United Nations failed to reach a solution. This might induce the United Nations to face up to the problem with more realism than it had hitherto displayed.

The Colonial Secretary then explained that His Majesty's Government had not put forward any particular scheme because they did not wish to prejudice the position in any way. In fact the partition proposed resembled in some respects the Bevin and Morrison proposals. Like them, it presupposed economic unity, and the viability of the two states concerned; although there was a formal division of territory in the case of the partition plan, the local autonomy granted to the two new states would in practice amount to much the same as that which they would have received under the Bevin-Morrison proposals. The result would probably work out in a way very much in keeping with his Majesty's Government's ideas.

The Colonial Secretary went on to say that we had had to face criticisms about Palestine for the last twenty or thirty years. It was in many ways because of this criticism and because of the attitude adopted by the Powers that the Palestine solution proved insoluble and itwas for that reason that it was now being submitted to the United Nations. To suggest a scheme to the United Nations would inevitably provoke further suspicions far and condemnations. In the circumstances, it was/better to propose nothing and bring it home to all concerned that a ready, easy solution was impossible. As regards the date of withdrawal, the matter was under consideration in London but he was unable to say anything further about it for the moment. He though that Mr. Younger's proposal would force the United Nations to agree to a solution without regard to its practicability. If so, His Majesty's Government would find themselves in a worse position than before.

Mr. Hadow

it was important in order to obtain their co-operation that the statement to be made by the Colonial Secretary should not contain or imply a condemnation of the United Nations. Mr. Henderson said that many Delegations had enquired of him what in His Majesty's Government's opinion was a just solution? When would the United Kingdom Delegation express themselves on this subject? In the General Debate? Or in the Sub-Committee? The Minister of State pointed out that there could be no answer at this stage to this question. It was inevitable that the Soviet or some other Delegation would follow the same tactics which we had adopted in respect of Greece's northern neighbours in the debate on the Greek question and would insist on an indication of our intention to co-operate in any solution recommended.

/2, INTERIM

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2. INTERIM COMMITTEE.

Mr. Jebb explained the various points on which the draft French resolution differed from that suggested by the United Kingdom Delegation. The Attorney General said that he would like to have our own resolution circulated before making his statement in Committee 1 on October 16th.

It was pointed out, however, that since the Commonwealth Delegations might have some amendments to suggest at the Commonwealth meeting on October 16th and since it would be difficult to obtain full publicity in the United Kingdom press for the Colonial Secretary's speech on Palestine and for the Attorney General's speech on the Interim Committee which was being made the same day, it would be better to postpone the Attorney General's speech if possible until the end of the General Debate on the Interim Committee in Committee 1. The United Kingdom resolution need therefore not be circulated until October 17th.

3. ECONOMIES IN DOCUMENTATION TRANSLATIONS.

There were no objections raised to the report of the Advisory Committee (A/C.5/168).

4. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST.

The meeting approved the brief on this subject (I.O.C. (N.Y.) (47) II (32)).

5. AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The Minister of State said that he had not had time to read Mr.

Bathurst's memorandum I.O.C. (N.Y.) (47) II (31) and since he must close
the meeting, he would prefer to have it discussed at the next Delegation
meeting. It was agreed that since the matter was due for discussion in
Sub-Committee 3 of the Sixth Committee in the afternoon of October 16th,
objections on the part of any member of the Delegation should be communicated
to Mr. Bathurst before mid-day on October 16th. It was agreed that Mr.
Younger's proposal for a re-draft of the rules narrowing down the powers of
Committee 5 should be discussed between Mr. Bathurst, Mr. Younger, Sir
William Mathews and the Minister of State later in the day.

6. KOREA.

Mr. Lawford said that the United States Delegation were considering our objections to their proposed resolution about Korea and that they appeared to see the force of them. He said that he had arranged to meet the Americans and would circulate a minute recording the result of his conversation.

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I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47)II (36).

16th October, 1947.

CORRIGENDUM.

Please note the following corrections:

- (1) Page One Line 10: for "to advise my government" read "to traduce my government".
- (2) Page 2 Line 28: The passage commencing "and in spite of" up to "in recent years" must be obliterated.
- (3) Page 6 Line 2: This sentence must now read as follows:
 "In short His Majesty's Government will not accept the responsibility for enforcement either alone or in the major role."
- (4) Page 6 Line 29: This must now read "law in Palestine.

 This factor greatly influences" etc.
- (5) Page 8 Line 16: a comma is essential after "responsibility to".

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1.0 C.(NY)(47) II (36)

Speech to be delivered by the Right Honourable Arthur Creech-Jones, M.P. in the Ad Hoc C. mittee on the Palestinian Question on Thursday, 16th October, 1947.

Before the General Discussion concludes and the Committee examines suggestions which have emerged for resolving the Palestine problem, I desire to make some observations, though in some respects it will be necessary for me to reiterate some of the points in my earlier statement.

It was to be expected that in the public discussion of the problem which Palestine presents, certain harsh and inaccurate statements should be made regarding the policy of the Mandatory Government and the work of the British authority in Palestine. We do not complain of fair and disinterested criticism. It has been easy enough for those without responsibility — for those with their own interests to promote — to advise my Government. But my silence must not be interpreted to mean that I endorse inaccuracies and prejudices and that there is no answer to the criticisms; rather, it should be understood that whatever the temptation to me to reply, my Delegation feel that in present circumstances no purpose is served by recriminatory talk when the Palestine problem is so difficult and grave as it is. It demands from all of us understanding, and as little prejudice as possible.

Palestine with, I note, general approval. The United Kingdom set out 30 years ago to establish a National Home for the Jewish people and undertook to do nothing which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Falestine. It undertoon, with international endorsement, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced. It has proved a thankless, and ultimately an impracticable, responsibility for, in the nature of things, neither Jews nor Arabs have been satisfied that their rights and claims have been fully acknowledged by the Mandatory; neither have felt able to assume genuina responsibility in government or administration and neither have been

prepared to admowledge differences and find some mutual accommodation. In the circumstances, the Mandate has proved self-contradictory and to a great extent unworkable. Nevertheless, the National Home has been established, a Jewish community of over 6000,000 has been built up, the Arab population has doubled, social standards have improved and economic activities have increased to the advantage of everyone. The services of the modern state have been created.

This is not only our judgment of the situation but is confirmed by the Report of the United Nations Special Committee from which I quote the following extracts:

"The present difficult circumstances should not distort the perspective of solid achievement arising from the joint efforts of the Jewish community and the Administration in laying the foundations of the National Home".

(Paragraph 93 on page 23)

"One may find in the record of the Palestine Administration evidence of persistent effort to effect gradual improvements in the economic and social condition of the Arab population".

(Paragraph 97 on page 24).

britain which has played some part in saving liberty against
tyranny in two world wars, which contributed something to the making of the
new Arab nations, which has given shelter in the United Kingdom since the
end of the war to over 300,000 individuals who would otherwise have been in
the displaced persons camps on the Continent and has found homes since 1933
for some 70,000 Newish refugees, and which by its struggle in war and its
administration helped to make the National Home possible, will be judged
before the bar of history in due course. I want only to say that in spite
of the revolts and the terrorism and in spite of the failure of at least one
of the communities to fulfill the normal responsibilities of citizens in the
maintenance of order in recent years, Palestine has built up its
services and still enjoys economic presperity; the machinery of administration has worked - a great tribute to the Palestine authorities and the
Government servants who under great strain and risk have been employed there,

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Our efforts to find accommodation between the communities in Palestine have failed. This cannot be attributed to the various terms of the White Paper of 1939 which in a number of major respects have not been implemented; indeed immigration has continued well beyond the 75,000 contemplated and constitutional changes, for reasons outside the Mandatory's control, have not been made. In the absence of full cooperation or of any positive contribution from other Powers and in view of the sheer hopelessness of the Mandatory obtaining a settlement and reconciliation of conflicts within the Mandate, the United Kingdom Government asked the United Nations to consider the future government of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee have submitted suggestions and we have made known our agreement with its twelve general recommendations. We have repeated our views that the Mandate should be laid down because it is unworkable and that obligations to the two communities irreconcilable and that Palestine should now move to independence. We made these decisions known without delay in order to facilitate the work of the Assembly.

In our discussions with the two communities in recent years we have evolved a number of proposals within the terms of the Mandate but experience finally convinced the United Kingdom Covernment that an impartial consideration by an international and independent authority was needed. It felt that such consideration should not be prejudiced by the advocacy by the United Kingdom of any particular scheme after our submission to the United Nations, though our knowledge and experience were at the disposal of the Assembly. This decision seemed the more necessary because there exist prejudices and suspicions about Britain's role in Palestine and these have been expressed over a period in bitter and unfriendly terms. Whatever the British views on possible working arrangements may be, we realised that our efforts in Palestine have failed to secure any accommodation between the two communities and that it was better we should urge no proposals if they were to be suspected of containing some hidden motive calculated to serve some purpose of our own, worthy or unworthy. The Special Committee with some assistance from the factual information we provided have produced their recommendations and many Member States have now freely experessed their views on the principles underlying the recommendations.

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The position of His Majesty's Covernment remains today as I have just stated. I would repeat, however, what I made clear in my first statement to this Committee - that I cannot easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly regarding the future structure of Palestine.

I also made clear I hope where the United Kingdom stood in the matter of implementation of any settlement and of any decision reached by the Assembly. Our singleminded purpose is to end the tragic situation in Palestine. Whether we have any interests in that unhappy land is irrevelant: our anxiety is to facilitate a settlement. The announcement of our decision that we shall make an early withdrawal not only of our forces but also of our administration is designed to remove all lingering doubt, to induce both parties to face up to the consequences of failure to come to an agreement, to emphasise the urgency of the whole matter and to leave the United Nations unhampered in its recommendations as to the best solution for the future government. It should help to bring home the realities of the situation and bring both sides together. It recognises the place of international authority in liquidating a grave and menacing conflict of interest which is likely to develop in that part of the world.

/In our.....

In our judgment a Mandatory Government may voluntarily relinquish the administration of a mandate.

His Majesty's Government are entitled in view of the general opinion expressed in this Committee and also the unworkability of the Mandate to lay it down and ask the United Nations because of the conflict and its menacing possibilities to consider how orderly government can be achieved and Palestino move rapidly to self-governing and / independence - the goal unanimously desired by all the parties and the nations represented here. We have struggled hard for a solution of these difficulties and at the cost of hundreds of lives and considerable wealth. Perhaps in the light of all the advice and criticism offered to us in the past by the nationals of other states, more effective ways of securing the elusive solution we were always seeking may be found. We cannot go on indefinitely faced with the hostility of the parties in Palestine, with fierce misrepresentations outside and with the drain on our own resources.

But no scheme for modifying the clash of rights as they are understood by the parties in Palestine can be divorced from the question of its implementation. It seems to us essential that in determining the nature of a settlement the Assembly should also determine the measures to implement it. It would be unreasonable to ask His Majesty's Government to carry the sole and full responsibility for the administration of Palestine and for enforcing changes which the United Nations regard as necessary. It has been suggested, as I understand it, that the United Kingdom should carry such responsibility throughout an indefinite transition period until independence is attained, acting under the supervision of the United Nations to enforce United Nations policy and being assisted by a programme of aid as mentioned by the distinguished delegate of the United States, including the possible assistance of a voluntarily recruited international police force. My Government desire that it should be clear beyond all doubt and ambiguity/not only is it our decision to wind up the Mandate but that within a limited period we shall withdraw. They made only two qualifications. First that in the event of a settlement between Jews and Arabs they would if so desired continue the administration of Palestine through the limited period of the transfer to independence. Second, that they would consider an invitation to /participate

participate in giving effect to a settlement in partnership with other members of the United Nations. In short His Majesty's Government will not accept in any case either an isolated responsibility in unforcement nor the major role.

They still hope that in view of their firm intention to withdraw both the Jewish and Arab communities will be seized with the realities of the situation and appreciate to the rull the unhappy consequences that can flow to themselves and their country by failing to agree on the future of Palestine. The United Kingdom Government most extractly hopes that the discussions of the past weeks have revealed the trend of world opinion and the dangers of a continuing struggle between the two peoples and that their representatives and the United Nations will quickly move to some to some accommodation which will bring armony and stability in this part of the Middle East. It is a new situation confronting the parties concerned. The weeks of discussion here should make this hope not note unrealistic (as it has been described) but less.

Moreover we trust that anxieties now felt in the Middle East about the present deliberations of the United Nations and their possible outcome will not load to military preparation or deployment of force amongst the peoples concerned. We hope that no steps will be taken that will be proverative and and result in violence. Certainly His Majesty's Government has given and will give no encor agement or assistance to actions which will inflame the alteration in the Middle East. Rumours and assertions that any such encouragement has been given are entirely without foundation.

Another dangerous factor in the present situation is the traffic in illegal immigration into Palestine and the connivance of some

Governments in the provision by their nationals of ships, arms and meney to defeat the Mandatory in the very difficult task of upholding the rule of law in Palestine, which greatly influences the feeling of the Arab world and sets irresponsibile influences at work which cannot readily be controlled.

In this last period, and in discharge of its duties, the British authorities will have no easy task in controlling the problem of immigration into Palestine particularly in the face of the bitter resentmentoof one of the

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parties that immigration continues at all and the indignation of the other that it is far too limitel. In any event it must be recognised that the immigration question is one which arouses bitter feelings in Palestine and that proposals for a change in the status quo should not be lightly put forward by those who have no responsibility for the consequences. The complications of this problem are known and the difficulties of the Mandatory in carrying its difficult and onerous responsibility should not be increased.

My delegation expresses the hope that the Committee will regard as an urgent contribution to the solution of the Palestine problem the resolution we have submitted concerning displaced persons in Europe and particularly that aspect of the matter concerning the absorption of Jews and other displaced persons in countries besides Palestine. No action is more calculated to help the Arab people to a fair appreciation of our sincerity in this problem of refugees and Jewish displaced persons and our sincerity about the Palestine problem than action on this resolution.

My Government will continue to make available what experience and knowledge it possesses for the use of the United Nations in its search for the solution to this problem. Our resources can be used to assist in arriving at an equitable and just plan. But I should be unfair to the Committee if I did not repeat that the sand has started to run and that conclusions should not be unduly delayed and the problem of implementation work. should be conceived as a parallel study and integral part of the Committee's/

On this last point my Government has stated (and it needs to be repeated in view of doubts expressed) that if the Assembly should recommend a policy which is not acceptable to the Jews and Arabs, some authority alternative to the United Kingdom must be provided in order to implement the United Nations policy. If it is desired that His Majesty's Government should participate with others in the enforcement of a settlement — and everything that can be done to bring about a permanent and acceptable solution to all concerned is essential — my Government adheres to the view — /that

that it must take into account the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it.

But I hope it will be agreed by all delegates that the view of the Special Committee's Report should be upheld that there is urgent need for change of status in Palestine. The withdrawal of the British administration there should if possible proceed by an orderly transfer of power to a suitable authority recognised by the United Nations to usher in independence. Britain in any case is unable to estain a burden too heavy for any mandatory to discharge, especially when its responsibilities are made the more difficult by the freedom enjoyed by the nationals of other states to employ every means to defeat her efforts. This problem should be studied at once for it is of the utmost importance that in the possible absence of agreement between the Jews and Arabs the complicated task of withdrawal should not be the prelude to disorder and disintegration of the public services essential for the normal life of Palestine. Without suitable authorities to negotiate and transfer responsibility to the preservation of institutions, communications and public works, the observance of law and fundamental services become problems of major difficulty. Same pracedure should be worked out by the substitute authority which will ensure proper sefeguards for the preservation of good order and the requirements necessary to give effective security forces for the pclice and other measures which the situation may require.

We hope that when a policy is worked out as representing the concensus of international opinion both parties will respect it and not resort to methods which will destroy security and create chaos and violence in Palestine. In that unhappy eventuality the United Nations must control a situation dangerous to peace. We hope that all concerned will realise that their ultimate best interests lie in a settlement that can be worked in goodwill and good neighbourliness.

My delegation will have the opportunity of expressing its views on certain of the proposals embedied in the resolutions before the Committee. We desire both now and in the future to live in friendly co-operation with heads and Jews alike. I have tried to restate the position of my Government and to suggest that we view our membership of this organisation as a /responsibility

responsibility not lightly carried. Our earnest wish is to be helpful in the great tasks the United Nations was brought into being to discharge. We ask the Committee to act quickly and we hope that the opportunity and the duty confronting the Member States will be conceived comprehensively and realistically as well as in a generous spirit. All of us want harmony restored to this Hely and tragic land.

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I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II 27th Meeting. 24th October, 1947.

CORRIGENDUM

Page 2, 17th line from the end.

The sentence beginning "It was pointed out in the course of the discussion" should read:-

"It was pointed out in the course of the discussion that Norway had a bad voting record in the Assembly and had, in particular, voted against us on the Colonial issue arising out of the Traffic in Women Convention, although the Norwegian Delegate had afterwards admitted to a member of the Delegation that he had voted for the wrong side and that he had fully understood our explanations of the issues involved".

Page 2, 4th line from the end.

For "had explained her attitude" read "had admitted having voted on the wrong side".